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Risk-aversion is advanced as a measure of the feeling guiding the person who faces a
decision with uncertain outcomes, whether about money or status or happiness or
anything else of importance. The concepts of utility and, implicitly, risk-aversion were used
first nearly 300 years ago, but risk-aversion was identified as a key dimensionless variable
for explaining monetary decisions only in 1964. A single class of utility function with
risk-aversion as sole parameter emerges when risk-aversion is regarded as a function of
the present wealth, rather than subject to alteration through imagining possible future
wealths. The adoption of a single class allows a more direct analysis of decisions, revealing
shortcomings in the use of conventional, Taylor series expansions for inferring
risk-aversion, over and above the obvious restrictions on perturbation size. Dimensional
analysis shows that risk-aversion is a function of three dimensionless variables particular
to the decision and a set of dimensionless character traits, identified later as the limiting
reluctance to invest and the lower threshold on risk-aversion. The theoretical framework
presented allows measurement of risk-aversion, paving the way for direct, evidence-
based utility calculations.
 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction constant. This lack of clarity has led to a number of differ-Risk-aversion is a fundamental parameter determining
how much satisfaction or utility we obtain from an experi-
ence, from a good or from money. It establishes the shape
of the utility function that quantifies how much satisfac-
tion or utility we derive. Before attempting to measure it,
it is obviously necessary to know what risk-aversion is
and have a proper model of how it acts through utility to
affect people’s decisions. The possibility then arises of
using the decision as the measured parameter and infer-
ring the risk-aversion that must have been in place for that
decision to have been made.
Unfortunately there has been incomplete agreement in
the past on the behaviour of risk-aversion, even on
whether and when risk-aversion can be regarded asent classes of functions being accorded the status of utility
function, and this uncertainty has affected existing mea-
surement methods, as will be explained. Thus the first
challenge of this paper is to establish a realistic under-
standing of risk-aversion and its behaviour as a prelude
to its accurate measurement.
The subject will be introduced by exploring the ways
that the ideas of utility and risk-aversion have developed.
The concepts are typically applied to the two canonical
cases: the purchase of insurance and the purchase of a lot-
tery ticket, which stand as proxies for additional types of
decision under uncertainty. The conventional way of esti-
mating the individual’s risk-aversion in these cases uses a
Taylor series expansion about the utility of the individual’s
starting wealth, as will be shown in Section 3. The required
assumption of small deviations from that wealth brings
with it significant limitations, but has the advantage that
the form of the utility function does not need to be
specified.
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expansion makes it unnecessary to consider whether or
not the individual alters his risk-aversion when he is mak-
ing a pairwise comparison between the utility of two possi-
ble outcomes. While there are good reasons for considering
the risk-aversion of a wealthy person generally to be differ-
ent from the risk-aversion of a poor person, it is argued in
[1] that it is not feasible for a rich person considering the
effect of a large insurance loss to experience the risk-
aversion felt by a person subsisting at the post-loss level
of wealth already. If it is accepted that risk-aversion is a
feeling that develops from the experience of living in a
given condition of life, lack of the required detailed
knowledge and feel would prevent a rich person consider-
ing insurance thinking himself fully into the role of a poor
person when evaluating his wealth after a substantial loss,
even if he were minded to do so and however much he
appealed to his imagination. Exactly the same argument
applies to the poor man considering a lottery, and to people
of all gradations of wealth in between. Nor is it sufficient to
have lived in a different state of wealth in the past, since the
feelings that the previous condition produced will be
remembered so imperfectly that it would not be possible
to develop the corresponding level of risk-aversion, even
if the person wished so to do. A more realistic model is
adopted in this paper. It is expected that the decisionmaker
will vary his risk-aversion during the course of his ponder-
ing on his decision, but that risk-aversion will stay constant
during each pairwise comparison of the outturn utilities
resulting from the adoption or non-adoption of a particular
course of action. This model is of strong economic
importance, since it will be shown that the associated
utility functions must then be of one class only, namely
the Power utility, with risk-aversion as sole parameter.
Dimensional analysis will be used to clarify what can
and should be measured in the insurance and lottery cases.
Two additional, dimensionless parameters are recom-
mended for measurement, which, like risk-aversion, are
particular to the person. They are both limiting values:
the first being the individual’s limiting reluctance to invest
(a scaled version of before and after utility differences)
while the second is the individual’s lower threshold on
risk-aversion.
Worked examples will be given of possible measure-
ment scenarios, both for lotteries and for insurance.
Problems with the existing methods based on Taylor series
expansions will be highlighted, including the rather strik-
ing fact that they fail to measure the right parameter in
the case of insurance. Guidance will be given on how to
obtain a good signal to noise ratio when measuring risk-
aversion. Finally, the residual difficulties will be brought
out of measuring a parameter that is personal to the indi-
vidual, and that will vary according to the importance of
the decision.2. Development of the concepts of utility and risk-
aversion
The study of utility as a way of explaining people’s
actions has a long and illustrious history, having gainedthe attention of a series of distinguished scholars, from
Daniel Bernoulli to John von Neumann. The derivatives of
utility have a particular importance in economic theory.
The first derivative will be discussed now and the second
derivative later in this Section. The first derivative, known
to economists as ’marginal utility’, is defined by the
Encyclopaedia Britannica [2] as ‘‘the additional satisfaction
or benefit (utility) that a consumer derives from buying an
additional unit of a commodity or service”. The utility to a
consumer of an additional unit of a product is normally
taken to be inversely related to the number of units of that
product he already owns.
The concept of marginal utility was key to Jevons’s solu-
tion [3] of the ‘paradox of value’, which had perplexed
economists until the late 19th century and is illustrated
in the much higher monetary value attached to diamonds
as compared with the same mass of bread, even though
the latter is an important dietary component and the
former merely an adornment. How can this be? Marginal
utility allowed the following explanation. People are
attracted to diamonds but the fact that they are scarce
means that only a small number of people can have many
of them. Under these conditions the marginal utility of dia-
monds to those people with few of them will be high,
which explains why they command a high price. On the
other hand, bread is in plentiful supply, so that customers
for bread can soon possess enough to satisfy their most
pressing need. As a person’s appetite for bread becomes
satisfied, so the additional utility of a further slice, the mar-
ginal utility, will go down, with the result the price he will
be prepared to pay will fall. A glut of bread could drive its
price down to practically zero, since all or almost all poten-
tial customers would have enough bread already [2,4].
Despite the success of marginal utility in providing a
conceptual framework for understanding the paradox of
value, there was clear difficulty in measuring quantita-
tively the utility that a person received from consuming a
product. So shortly after Jevons’s work, Edgeworth [5]
began the development of indifference theory. Whereas
utility theory assumes, at least in principle, the numerical
measurability of the difference in the utility conferred by
two options on a person or an organisation, indifference
theory rests on the weaker assumption that the person
can specify only which option yields him the higher utility.
Further important work, carried out by Pareto in the 1900s
[6] and, thirty years later, by Hicks [7] led to the wide
acceptance of indifference theory.
But shortly after Hicks’ magnum opus was published,
the possibility of numerical measurement of utility was
revived by von Neumann and Morgenstern in their highly
influential book, Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour
[8], published in 1944. In a direct challenge to Hicks’s indif-
ference curve methods, they claimed that:
‘‘the treatment by indifference curves implies either too
much or too little: if the preferences of the individual
are not all comparable, then the indifference curves do
not exist. If the individual’s preferences are all compara-
ble, then we can even obtain a (uniquely defined)
numerical utility, which renders the indifference curves
superfluous.”.
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not been pursued before: ‘‘Ja hat denn das niemand gese-
hen?” (‘‘But has nobody seen this before?”) was said to
have been his exclamation after writing down a set of
axioms to underpin expected utility theory [9]. Von
Neumann and Morgenstern pointed out that, for the case
where options, A, B, and C were put in that order of prefer-
ence by an individual, then a numerical measure of utility
could be obtained by eliciting from him a further piece of
information, namely the probability, a, at which he would
be prepared to accept a probabilistic combination of A and
C as equivalent to option B. The individual’s indifference
between options B and the probabilistic combination of
options A and C produces an equality in utility:
u Bð Þ ¼ au Að Þ þ 1 að Þu Cð Þ ð1Þ
where u ð Þ is the utility function used to calculate the per-
son’s utility from the option. Eq. (1) provides a schema for
allocating a utility value to option B, given the utility of
options A and C, and has come to be known as the
‘standard gamble’.
The book by von Neumann and Morgenstern introduced
Game Theory as a new field of study. It also put the defini-
tion of utility theory on an axiomatic basis, proving that if a
numerical measurement or estimate of a person’s utility, u,
could be made, then that utility would be correct to a
positive linear transformation, so that v would be an
equally valid measure of utility, where v ¼ auþ b; a > 0.
But utility functions had been usedwell before this time,
with the Swiss mathematician, Gabriel Cramer incorporat-
ing a utility function in his proposed solution to the ‘St.
Petersburg Paradox’. This was a gambling problem where
the mathematical expectation of money won gave poor
guidance to the decision maker [10], and a brief discussion
is offered because of its importance to the development of
expected utility theory, a concept of relevance to this paper.
The game consists of counting the tosses of a fair coin before
a head appears andpaying out the sumof £2n1 when a head
occurs for the first time on the nth toss. The question arises
as to what is a fair price to pay for the opportunity to play
this game. The head could occur on the first throw or on
the second or, with decreasing probability, on the third or
fourth and so on. The chance of a sequence of n  1 tails fol-
lowed by a head is 1=2ð Þn1  1=2 ¼ 1=2n. A return must
come at somepoint,with a lowpay out if the first head turns
up early and a high return if it occurs late. Allowing for all
possible outcomes, the expected value of that randommon-
etary gain, G, is EðGÞ ¼P1n¼1 1=2n 2n1
¼ 1=2P1n¼1 1=2n 2n ¼ 1=2 1þ 1þ 1þ . . .ð Þ ¼ 1. Using this
result for guidance, a person should be prepared to pay an
enormous sum for the chance to play, but the paradox lies
in the fact that no-one is prepared to pay very much at all.
Cramer suggested in a 1728 letter to Nicolas Bernoulli
(included at the end of [11]) that ‘‘in their theory, mathe-
maticians evaluate money in proportion to its quantity
while, in practice, people with common sense evaluate
money in proportion to the utility they can obtain from it.”
To model this ‘common sense’ evaluation, he used a square
root function to generate the utility of the gains in his
attempt to explain how normal people would react to theproblem. In finding the utility of the gain rather than of
the individual’s total wealth he was anticipating
Kahneman and Tversky’s Nobel prize winning work of
250 years later [12]. The same concept has been used
recently to explain multibuy retail promotions such as
buy-one-get-one-free [13–15].
Rather than the expected value, E½G of the random gain,
G, Cramer now found the expected value of utility, E½U, in
which U ¼ UðGÞ:
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where the fact that
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
=2 is less than 1.0 causes the series
to converge and so produce the value shown at the end.
The monetary sum corresponding to this level of utility
of gain is now found by reversing the square root transfor-
mation, viz. taking the square: E Uð Þð Þ2 ¼ £2:91, to give the
certainty equivalent, which Cramer suggested would be
reasonable for a person to pay to play the game. The small-
ness of this sum suggests that a ’man with common sense’
would be much too risk averse to be guided by the
expected value of gain alone.
A similar answer was proposed independently by
Daniel Bernoulli in 1738 [11], who made two changes,
however. The first was to use a logarithmic utility function,
and the second was to argue for the inclusion of the wealth
of the player as an important influence. Having paid a sum,
t, for a ticket to play the game, the player’s expected
change in utility from that, uðwÞ, of his initial wealth, w,
would be
E½UuðwÞ¼
X1
n¼1
1
2n
ln w tþ2n1
 
 lnw
¼1
2
ln w tþ1ð Þþ1
4
ln w tþ2ð Þ
þ . . . 1
2k
ln w tþ2k1
 
þ . . . lnw
¼ ln w tþ1ð Þ12 w tþ2ð Þ14 . . . w tþ2k1
  1
2k . . .
 
 lnw
ð3Þ
The player will be indifferent between playing or not
playing the game if the expected utility from playing is
the same as the starting utility, implying that
w t þ 1ð Þ12 w t þ 2ð Þ14 . . . w t þ 2k1
  1
2k . . .w ¼ 0
ð4Þ
Now ðaþ bÞ1=ð2bÞ ¼ 1þ a=bð Þ1=ð2bÞb1=ð2bÞ¼ eðlnð1þa=bÞÞ=ð2bÞ
eðln bÞ=ð2bÞ, so that for constant a; lim
b!1
ðaþ bÞ1=ð2bÞ ¼ 1.
Putting a ¼ w t and b ¼ 2k1, it can be seen that each
of the product terms in Eq. (4), including the final, kth term,
is bounded. In practice, the terms in the product on the
left-hand side of Eq. (4) are very close to unity from about
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may be found by using 50 terms. Thus a person with a total
starting wealth of £3 should be prepared to pay up to
£2.54, one with a £1000 should pay up to £5.97, while a
millionaire should be prepared to pay only a little more
at £10.94. (In fact, as pointed out by Bernoulli, for large
wealths, the approximation t  0 can be used in Eq. (4).
More precisely, w t is being replaced by w, indicating
that the ticket-price has been deducted already from the
starting wealth, so that prior ownership of the ticket is
assumed. Hence what is then being found from Eq. (4) is
the ‘certainty equivalent’ gain in wealth from holding a
ticket to play.) Thus Bernoulli provided a second mathe-
matical justification for the common sense view that only
small sums should be risked on this game, a solution he
acknowledged freely was similar to Cramer’s. His paper
was further noteworthy in defining the expected utility
(‘‘emolumentum medium”) when many options are possi-
ble, and the use of expected utility in insurance, where
he explained quantitatively the different viewpoints of
the insurer and the insured because of their difference in
wealth.
Daniel Bernoulli’s 1738 paper defined marginal utility,
mðwÞ, as a function of wealth, and in differential terms:
‘‘the utility resulting from any small increase in wealth will
be inversely proportionate to the quantity of goods previ-
ously possessed”, a statement that is almost identical to
the last line of the first paragraph of this Section. The only
change of significance is the replacement of Bernoulli’s
‘‘proportionate” by the more general ‘‘related”.
The derivative of marginal utility has particular impor-
tance for risk studies. Pratt [16] made a link between risk
and the negative of the normalised derivative of marginal
utility, calling it the ‘‘local proportional risk aversion”.
‘Elasticity’ is the word used by economists to denote a nor-
malised derivative, so that the same quantity can also be
described as the ‘negative of the elasticity of marginal util-
ity of wealth’. The ‘coefficient of relative risk aversion’ is
another name. But the desirability of a shorter title means
has led the author to use the hyphenated term, ‘risk-
aversion’, e, here and elsewhere:
e ¼ w
m
dm
dw
¼ wu
00
u0
ð5Þ
Risk-aversion, e, as defined in Eq. (5), is a measure of a
person’s actual aversion to risk (a demonstration of the
validity of this notion is given at the end of Section 3.1).
Regarding aversion to risk as a feeling or an attitude (which
we will hope to measure under certain circumstances), e is
helped enormously as a mathematical measure of aversion
to risk by its non-dimensional status, which allows it to be
applied universally. This is necessary because the feeling of
unease in the presence of uncertainty that constitutes
aversion to risk may occur in a multiplicity of contexts:
when considering dangers to health, to life style, to status,
and so on, as well as to wealth. For an example quite unre-
lated to money see [17], where the apparently anomalous
behaviour of 5-year old children at play may be explained
quantitatively using risk-aversion.
It may be commented that lack of universality is a sev-
ere handicap to an alternative sometimes advanced as ameasure of aversion to risk, namely u00=u0. While this
expression might seem to possess a superficial generality
as the ratio of two derivatives, and is dignified by the name
’coefficient of absolute risk aversion’, which seems to have
a fundamental ring, we may see from Eq. (5) that this
parameter is in fact simply e=w. Hence, if we take w to
be wealth, for example, the parameter will have units £1
or U1 or $1 or whatever. Thus even in the straightforward
case of decisions regarding wealth, a single currency will
need to be agreed if the same value is to be returned in
fully analogous circumstances (see also [18]). But now let
us take a diverse case, where, for example, w denotes pop-
ularity that may be at risk from a person’s decision. It is
clear that there will be enormous if not insuperable diffi-
culties in comparing the coefficient of absolute risk aver-
sion applicable in this situation with the corresponding
value in the case where wealth is at stake. In particular,
this will be the case even when the person’s levels of stress
hormones are very similar when he is taking the two deci-
sions, which would indicate that he was feeling a similar
aversion to risk.
The interpretation of risk-aversion in terms of what a
person feels when taking a decision, irrespective of the
precise subject of that decision, gives guidance on how that
parameter may vary during the decision making process.
For when he is pondering on his decision between two
options where the balance of advantage is not clear cut,
the person explores in his mind first how he would need
to feel to choose option A and all that it entails, and then
how he would need to feel to choose option B and its likely
consequences. This process may be seen as the decision
maker trying out various levels of risk-aversion to find
the one with which he feels most content.
But, as explained in the Introduction, he will maintain
his risk-aversion constant during each pairwise compar-
ison of outturn utilities.
This conclusion has significant implications for the per-
missible form for a utility function, which Section 5 shows
must belong to the Power family of utility functions,
expressed most generally as:
uðwÞ ¼
w1e  1
1 e for e – 1
lnw for e ¼ 1
8<
: ð6Þ
Interestingly, it may be seen from Eq. (6) that the loga-
rithmic utility function advocated by Bernoulli corre-
sponds to a utility function with a risk-aversion of 1.0.
This is, in fact, the value of risk-aversion recommended
by the UK’s Treasury [19]. Meanwhile, Cramer’s square-
root utility function can be seen to imply a risk-aversion
of 0.5. Thus both Bernoulli and Cramer chose to use the
Power utility function, and their results bracket a recent
estimate of the average risk-aversion of UK citizens,
e ¼ 0:85 [20,21]. It should be noted, however, that the
range of risk-aversions considered during the period of
mulling over the decision may be much wider, and the
value of risk-aversion finally selected might well be differ-
ent from either Bernoulli’s or Cramer’s suggestion, depend-
ing on the importance of the decision to the person
concerned, a question tied up intimately with his level of
wealth.
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expansions
By the argument made in Section 1, only the Power
family of utility functions, with risk-aversion as sole
parameter, can offer a truly realistic model of human
decision making. In fact, economists and actuaries often
adopt the Power utility function [22]. Nevertheless others
have chosen different functions of roughly the same
shape to represent utility, and this has provided an
incentive to devise methods of measuring risk-aversion
independent of the precise form of the utility function
used. Such methods have typically applied a Taylor series
expansion to the two canonical cases of a decision under
risk, namely an individual taking part in a lottery or an
individual seeking insurance. The small perturbations
permitted by these methods restrict their range of valid-
ity, of course, but additional shortcomings have been
found to exist.
3.1. Where the individual takes a voluntary risk: a lottery
Let there be a lottery offering a prize, z, with probability
of winning, p. In such a case, the expected value of the
random payout, Z, to the individual (either z or 0) will be
E½Z ¼ pzþ ð1 pÞ:0 ¼ pz ð7Þ
If the individual’s maximum acceptable price (MAP) for
a ticket is t0 ¼ pz, it can be seen that he is valuing the ticket
on its expectedmoney value only: t0 ¼ E½Z. This is the risk-
neutral position, and corresponds to a risk-aversion of zero,
a statement justified at the end of this subsection. But the
individual may be prepared to pay a different amount,
indicating a different level of risk-aversion. It is reasonable
to assume that the amount, t, that an individual of starting
wealth, w, pays for a ticket gives an indication of his
dimensionless risk-aversion, e.
Buying a ticket for twill mean that his wealth decreases
initially fromw tow t, which will mean that the utility of
his wealth, its worth to him, will also decrease. That
decrease will be permanent if he fails to win, when his util-
ity will be u w tð Þ. This situation has a probability of
occurrence of ð1 pÞ. On the other hand, if he wins then
his wealth will rise to w t þ z, bringing with it an
increase in utility to u wþ z tð Þ, which has a probability,
p, of being valid.
The person’s expected utility after buying a ticket is
then:
E½U ¼ pu wþ z tð Þ þ ð1 pÞu w tð Þ ð8Þ
Assuming that both z t << w and t << w, each of the
two utility terms on the right-hand side of Eq. (1) may be
expanded using the first three terms of a Taylor series:
u wþ z tð Þ  uðwÞ þ z tð Þu0ðwÞ þ 1
2
z tð Þ2u00ðwÞ ð9Þ
u w tð Þ  uðwÞ  tu0ðwÞ þ 1
2
t2u00ðwÞ ð10ÞThe warning needs to be given at this point that
requirement that z t << w means that lotteries offering
a very large prize, such as a national lottery, are not cov-
ered by this analysis.
Substituting into Eq. (8) gives:
E½U ¼ puðwÞ þ pzu0ðwÞ  ptu0ðwÞ þ 1
2
pz2u00ðwÞ  pztu00ðwÞ
þ 1
2
pt2u00ðwÞ þ uðwÞ  tu0ðwÞ þ 1
2
t2u00ðwÞ  puðwÞ
þ ptu0ðwÞ  1
2
pt2u00ðwÞ ¼ pzu0ðwÞ þ 1
2
pz2u00ðwÞ
 pztu00ðwÞ þ uðwÞ  tu0ðwÞ þ 1
2
t2u00ðwÞ ¼ uðwÞ
þ pz tð Þu0ðwÞ þ 1
2
pz2  2pzt þ t2 u00ðwÞ
ð11Þ
The individual will expect to see an advantage or at
least no disadvantage from buying a lottery ticket.
Therefore a price acceptable to an individual is one that
will cause him to expect the utility after buying the ticket
to be at least as great as his utility without buying it:
E½UP uðwÞ ð12Þ
Combining inequality (12) with Eq. (11) implies that:
pz tð Þu0ðwÞ þ 1
2
pz2  2pzt þ t2 u00ðwÞP 0 ð13Þ
which may be rearranged into the form:
u
00ðwÞ
u0ðwÞ 6
2 pz tð Þ
pz2  2pzt þ t2 ð14Þ
subject to the important provisos that
ðiÞ u0ðwÞ > 0; and
ðiiÞ pz2  2pzt þ t2 ¼ z2 p 1 2 t
z
 
þ t
z
 2 !
> 0
ð15Þ
Condition (i) can be assumed to hold since utility can be
expected to increase with wealth, while condition (ii) will
be valid provided t 6 z=2, which can be expected to be the
case for most lotteries of interest.
Using the definition of risk-aversion, e, given by Eq. (5),
the value of risk-aversion, e, corresponding to a fixed ticket
price, t, will obey the inequality:
e 6 2w pz tð Þ
pz2  2pzt þ t2 ð16Þ
If tickets are on sale at a fixed price and bought by a
number of people, the highest value of risk-aversion that
an individual with wealth, wi, may experience while still
being prepared to buy the ticket for t is given by the equal-
ity condition of inequality (16):
e maxjt;wið Þ ¼ 2wi pz tð Þ
pz2  2pzt þ t2 ð17Þ
An individual with wealth, wi, might have the potential
to be more risk confident in this situation, so that his risk-
aversion is less than e maxjt;wið Þ and be prepared to offer
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level. If so he is benefiting from what is known by econo-
mists as the ’consumer surplus’ that may be obtained in
free and open markets where one price is offered to all.
But it is assumed at this point that the person’s maxi-
mum acceptable price, tmax i, for a lottery ticket may be eli-
cited, perhaps by some sort of auction. The process of
pushing the individual to his maximum price can be visu-
alised as one where the general price of the ticket is raised,
which will affect e maxjt;wið Þ, and recording how long the
individual stays in the auction. Now e maxjt;wið Þ is a
decreasing function of t as long as t lies in the range
0 < t < t0 1þ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃoApð Þ, where oA ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃð1 pÞ=pp is the odds
against winning (see Appendix A). Since p is small in a typ-
ical lottery, the upper bound of the range is likely to be
large. Thus raising the price has the effect of ‘lowering
the bar’ on maximum allowable risk-aversion,
e maxjt;wið Þ. To stay in, the person must be able to tolerate
a lower risk-aversion (be bolder) than the current level of
e maxjt;wið Þ. The further important assumption is now
made that when person i has been pushed to offer his
MAP, tmax i, his expected utility after buying the ticket will
just match his utility without buying it – the ‘utility break-
even’ condition. This assumption is often made without
comment as if obviously true, but in fact its justification
requires the operation of a further mechanism, as
explained in Section 8.
Assuming the operation of the mechanism described in
Section 8, the individual’s risk-aversion, eBEi, at this break-
even condition now follows from the development of the
equality condition of inequality (12): E½U ¼ uðwÞ, leading
to:
eBEi ¼ 2wi pz tmax ið Þ
pz2  2pztmax i þ ti2max
¼ 2wi=tmax i pz=tmax i  1ð Þ
p z=tmax ið Þ2  2pz=tmax i þ 1
ð18Þ
Eq. (18) has an auxiliary purpose in that it may be used
to justify the use of e as a measure of aversion to risk. For if
the individual’s maximum acceptable price for a ticket
happens to be tmax i ¼ pz, then Eq. (18) gives eBEi ¼ 0. This
position, where the individual’s maximum acceptable price
is set by purely monetary considerations (substitute e ¼ 0
into Eq. (6)) may be regarded as the risk neutral position.
On the other hand, should person i set tmax i < pz then
eBEi > 0. Such a person can be seen to be exhibiting greater
caution with respect to the lottery than the person who
sets tmax i ¼ pz, and therefore might reasonably be called
risk averse. But a person setting tmax i > pz will be keener
to play the lottery than the person who sets tmax i ¼ pz
and may thus be described as risk confident. Now
eBEi > 0. Hence e is well correlated with what we might
in normal speech call aversion to risk, which provides a
justification for calling it ‘risk-aversion’.3.2. When the individual seeks to avoid an already-imposed
risk: insurance
Now let us consider an individual of starting wealth, w,
facing a loss z with probability, p, in a given period and usehis insurance premium, t, for avoiding any possibility of
this loss to estimate his risk-aversion, e.
If he does not buy insurance, the expected value, E Uend½ ,
of his utility at the end of the period, Uend, will be:
E Uend½  ¼ pu w zð Þ þ ð1 pÞuðwÞ ð19Þ
whereas if he buys the insurance at premium, t, his utility
at the end of the period will be u w tð Þ, with certainty. The
individual will be content to pay a premium, t, satisfying:
u w tð ÞP pu w zð Þ þ ð1 pÞuðwÞ ð20Þ
An expansion of the term, u w tð Þ, using the first two
terms of a Taylor series, has been provided above as
Eq. (10), under the assumption that t << w. The term,
u w zð Þ may be expanded in a similar fashion, provided
it is possible to assume that z << w:
u w zð Þ  uðwÞ  zu0ðwÞ þ 1
2
z2u00ðwÞ ð21Þ
The necessity of assuming that z << w means that this
analysis can apply to the insurance of, for example a wash-
ing machine costing £250, with an annual insurance pre-
mium of tens of pounds, but not directly to house
insurance for the average person. This point will be
returned to later.
Substituting from Eqs. (10) and (21) into inequality (20)
gives:
uðwÞ tu0ðwÞþ1
2
t2u00ðwÞP puðwÞpzu0ðwÞ
þ1
2
pz2u00ðwÞþuðwÞpuðwÞ ð22Þ
or
1
2
u00ðwÞ t2  pz2 P t  pzð Þu0ðwÞ ð23Þ
Hence
u00ðwÞ t
z
 2
 p
 !
P
2
z
t
z
 p
 
u0ðwÞ ð24Þ
It is safe to assume that both the probability of loss, p,
and the ratio of the maximum acceptable premium to
the loss, t=z, are both strictly fractional. Fractionality
implies the following two inequalities:
t
z
 2
<
t
z
ð25Þ
and
p < p
1
2 ð26Þ
Now the expected loss is given by
E½Z ¼ pzþ ð1 pÞ:0 ¼ pz ð27Þ
(c.f. Eq. (7)). In the (unlikely) case where the premium is
set less than or equal to the expected loss, then t 6 pz or
t=z 6 p so that, using inequality (25), t=zð Þ2 < p or
t=zð Þ2  p < 0 . Moreover, when the premium is set above
the expected loss but in the range: p < t=z < p12 (a range
of more than an order of magnitude when p < 0.01), the
same condition still holds: t=zð Þ2  p < 0. The reasonable
P.J. Thomas /Measurement 79 (2016) 285–301 291assumption is made that u0ðwÞ > 0, corresponding to utility
increasing with wealth. Moreover, the term, tz
 2  p ,
will be negative whenever t=z <
ﬃﬃﬃ
p
p
. Hence, dividing both
sides of the inequality (24) by these terms will give:
u00ðwÞ
u0ðwÞ 6
2
z
t
z p
t
z
 2  p for
t
z
<
ﬃﬃﬃ
p
p ð28Þ
or
u00ðwÞ
u0ðwÞ 6
2
z
p tz
p tz
 2 for tz < ﬃﬃﬃpp ð29Þ
Hence
u
00ðwÞ
u0ðwÞ P
2
z
p tz
t
z
 2  p for
t
z
<
ﬃﬃﬃ
p
p ð30Þ
Hence, using the definition of risk-aversion from Eq. (5)
and rearranging gives the boundary on risk-aversion set
by a fixed premium, t:
eP
2w pz tð Þ
t2  pz2  for tz < ﬃﬃﬃpp ð31Þ
If a common premium, t, is set and taken up by a num-
ber of people, each with wealth, wi, then the lowest value
of risk-aversion that an individual with wealth, wi, may
experience while still being prepared to pay an insurance
premium of t is given by the equality condition of inequal-
ity (31):
e minjwi; tð Þ ¼ 2wi pz tð Þ
t2  pz2 ð32Þ
Any individual, i, may have the potential to be more
risk-averse in this situation than is suggested by
e minjwi; tð Þ because he is temperamentally more timid,
but the premium level is not pushing him to his maximum
caution or highest level of risk-aversion. So in the case of
insurance, too, it is possible for an individual to benefit
from the ‘consumer surplus’ noted with a lottery.
In a similar way to the lottery case, the method now
involves the assumption that the person’s maximum
acceptable price, tmax i, for the insurance premium may be
elicited.
The process of pushing the individual to the maximum
premium he will accept can be visualised as one where the
general insurance premium is raised, which will affect
e minjt;wið Þ, and recording how long the individual stays
in the exercise. Now e minjt;wið Þ is an increasing function
of t as long as t lies in the range 0 < t < z
ﬃﬃﬃ
p
p
. Thus raising
the premium has the effect of ‘raising the bar’ of minimum
allowable risk-aversion, e minjt;wið Þ. To stay in, the person
must be able to tolerate a higher risk-aversion (be more
cautious) than the current level of e minjt;wið Þ.
The further important assumption is now made that
when person i has been pushed to offer his MAP, tmax i,
his expected utility after buying the insurance will just
match his utility without buying it – the ‘utility breakeven’
condition. Thus his risk-aversion, eBEi, at this breakeven
condition now follows from the development of the equal-
ity condition of inequality (31), leading to:eBEi ¼ 2wi=tmax i pz=tmax i  1ð Þ
1 p z=tmax ið Þ2
  for tmax i
z
<
ﬃﬃﬃ
p
p ð33Þ
The assumption that the person decides on his maxi-
mum acceptable price for insurance, tmax i, at the utility
break-even condition is often taken for granted, but this
will be considered further in Section 6, which shows that
this assumption can be improved upon.
3.3. The nature of the minimum and maximum risk-aversions
for person i
It may be observed first that a person’s limiting value of
risk aversion depends on his starting wealth, wi, as well as
on the particular circumstances of the decision: the
amount to be gained or lost and the probability of either
eventuality. Part of the dependence on wealth is explicit
in Eqs. (18) and (33), but a further important dependency
comes in via the individual’s choice of maximum ticket
price or maximum insurance premium, tmax i. These will
be affected by how much money the person has:
tmax i ¼ tmax i wið Þ, as asserted by Bernoulli [11]. So while a
casual reading of Eqs. (18) and (33) might suggest that
risk-aversion would rise with wealth, in fact the reverse
is found to be true normally, a fact that is explicable in
the two cases considered above in terms of the variability
of tmax i with starting wealth. For example, a poor person
might decide to insure a washing machine for more than
the expected loss, indicating a positive risk-aversion, while
a rich person might decide that he can stand the loss and
pay nothing for insurance. Putting tmax i ¼ 0 into Eq. (33)
for the case of the rich person shows that his minimum
risk-aversion is negative in this case, and less than the poor
person whose choice is to take out insurance because he
cannot stand the loss.
In considering the most he will pay to take part in a lot-
tery or to be insured, the person may consider several max-
imum ticket prices or maximum insurance premia, t testð Þmax i, as
candidates for his tmax i and carry out pairwise utility com-
parisons, for example between the outturns with and with-
out insurance at that premium. The possible maximum
price or premium, t testð Þmax i, will change before each successive
comparison of outturns – this is part of the process of pon-
dering on a decision. But risk-aversion will stay constant
during the comparison process itself, a procedure endorsed
implicitly by Bernoulli, who, by choosing a logarithmic
utility function, kept the risk-aversion constant at e ¼ 1:0.
See Eq. (3), where the same utility function, u ð Þ ¼ ln ð Þ,
is applied whether the wealth is low: w t þ 1 or extraor-
dinarily high: w t þ 2k1; k !1.
4. Using dimensional analysis to shed light on risk-
aversion in both insurance and lottery cases
4.1. Insurance premium
As in Section 3.2, let it be assumed that the person’s
maximum acceptable price for the insurance premium
can be elicited in some reliable way. It is then reasonable
to expect the risk-aversion for person i; etmax i, buying an
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depend on the maximum the person is prepared to pay
for his insurance premium (£), tmax i, and on two further
sets of variables. The first set will be those variables partic-
ular to the decision currently being made, namely:
z, the value of the possible loss (£)
wi, the person’s initial wealth (£)
p, the probability of incurring the loss (dimensionless).
while the second set will be the minimum number, m, of
underlying character traits, s1i; s2i; . . . ; smi, relevant to tak-
ing decisions under risk and particular to the individual.
The influence of these traits on the decision will be
expressed via risk-aversion, ei, the value of which they
may influence by one of the following operations:
 increase, by addition of a positive number or by multi-
plication by a number greater than unity,
 decrease, by subtraction of a positive number or by divi-
sion by a number greater than unity, or
 limit, through setting a limiting value.
If the nondimensionality of risk-aversion is to be pre-
served, the parameters, ski, involved in such operations
must be dimensionless. Moreover, if one of the parameters,
ski, should depend on other parameters, then the require-
ment for the nondimensionality of risk-aversion requires
that relationship to be expressible as a function of nondi-
mensional variables. Moreover, the parameters, ski, are,
by definition, independent of the problem being consid-
ered, and so will be constant for any given decision. A set
of suitable parameters, ski, will be derived in Section 6,
but it is not necessary at this stage either to specify their
number, m, or what they are.
Observe that the notation for risk-aversion has been
changed from eBEi to etmax i, which denotes the risk-
aversion associated with individual i’s maximum accept-
able premium, not tying it to the condition of utility
break-even. This form removes the assumption implicit
in the Taylor series approach that the maximum accept-
able price for the insurance premium occurs at the condi-
tion of utility breakeven.
Them + 4 variables just discussed are advanced as com-
plete in the sense that no other influence is significant, so
that we may write:
etmax i ¼ f tmax i; z;wi;p; s1i; s2i; ::; smið Þ ð34Þ
Using square brackets, [], to denote the operation of
finding the dimension of a parameter, we may write
etmax i½  ¼ 1
tmax i½  ¼ C
½z ¼ C
wi½  ¼ C
½p ¼ 1
ski½  ¼ 1; k ¼ 1;2; . . . ;m
ð35Þ
where C represents currency, while 1 denotes non-
dimensionality. Clearly only one dimension is displayedin the m + 4 variable set listed on the right-hand side of
Eq. (34), and this is currency. Applying the principles of
dimensional analysis [23–25], we may non-
dimensionalise by choosing the single parameter, tmax i, as
the sole member of a dimensionally independent subset.
(Since there is only one member, it satisfies trivially the
condition that its dimension cannot be composed of the
dimensions of different members.) This subset is dimen-
sionally complete in the sense that the dimensions of
remaining the variables, namely etmax i; z;wi; p, and
ski; k ¼ 1;2; . . . ;m may be expressed as powers (including
a power 0 as necessary) of the dimensions of that subset, in
this case the single dimension of currency, C.
By the Buckingham Pi Theorem [23–25], the number of
independent quantities governing the individual’s mini-
mum risk-aversion is then reduced from m + 4 to m + 3,
and the dimensionless parameter, etmax i, may specified in
terms of dimensionless quantities:
etmax i ¼ g ztmax i ;
wi
tmax i
;p; s1i; s2i; . . . ; smi
 
ð36Þ
Thus the variables particular to the problem may be
reduced to: (i) the size of the possible loss, denominated
in units of the individual’s maximum acceptable insurance
premium, z=tmax i, (ii) the size of the individual’s wealth,
denominated in the same units, wi=tmax i and (iii) the prob-
ability of the loss, p. The probability of loss, p, its magni-
tude, z, and the individual’s starting wealth, wi, will all be
constant for a particular decision, as will the personal
traits, s1i; s2i; . . . ; smi, by definition constant over long peri-
ods. Hence it is clear from Eq. (36) that etmax i can vary only
as a result of the variation in tmax i as different values are
selected for consideration.
[The formulation of Eq. (36) is not unique, since it
would be possible to choose either z orwi as the sole mem-
ber of a dimensionally independent subset. Choosing the
latter as an example would result in the first two variables
in Eq. (36) being changed to z=wi and tmax i=wi, for some
new function, g. Of course, the fact that we may write
z=wi ¼ z=tmax ið Þ wi=tmax ið Þ1 and tmax i=wi ¼ wi=tmax ið Þ1
shows the equivalence of the two approaches.]
By the model of [1], the individual will postulate to
himself several test maximum insurance premia, t testð Þmax i, dur-
ing the process of pondering his decision, each of which
will have associated with it a corresponding risk-
aversion, e testð Þtmax i, given by Eq. (36). A pairwise comparison
will be carried out at each test value, t testð Þmax i, between the
utility following the purchase of insurance at that pre-
mium, t testð Þmax i, and the expected utility without, using the
same test risk-aversion, e testð Þtmax i.
The model of [1] implies that associated with each test
premium, t testð Þmax i, there will be a unique value of risk-
aversion, e testð Þtmax i, which will be used in the calculation of
utility at the three possible wealth states associated with
the decision: w; w z and w t testð Þmax i. Although it shows
that risk-aversion must be a constant at each value of the
test premium, Eq. (36) does not prove this premise, since
there could conceivably be three different functions,
g1; g2 and g3, satisfying Eq. (36), producing a different
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provide a confirmation of Taylor-series Eq. (33), nor vice
versa. However the two equations do identify the same
three independent variables particular to the current deci-
sion. The neglect in Eq. (33) of the individual’s personal
traits, s1i; s2i; . . . ; smi, implies the assumption in the Taylor
series model that the individual’s risk tendencies, either
aversion to risk or confidence in the face of risk, are cap-
tured fully in tmax i, the maximum the person is prepared
to pay for his insurance premium. Other models are possi-
ble, however, as will be shown in Section 6.
4.2. Lottery ticket
Arguments similar to the insurance example may be
applied to the case of a lottery. The assumption is made
that while peripheral considerations, such as advertising
for the lottery and the design and colour of the ticket,
may act as inducements to take part, they will have no sig-
nificant effect on the person’s decision on what should be
his maximum acceptable ticket price. It is then reasonable
to expect that the risk-aversion, etmax i, for person i that is
associated with his maximum acceptable ticket price,
tmax i, will depend on and only on:
z, the value of the prize.
wi, the person’s initial wealth.
p, the probability of winning.
tmax i, the maximum the person is prepared to pay for his
ticket.
s1i; s2i; . . . ; smi, the individual’s personal traits relevant
to taking decisions under risk.
The mathematics now follow a path fully analogous to
that of Section 4.1, so that
etmax i ¼ g ztmax i ;
wi
tmax i
;p; s1i; s2i; . . . ; smi
 
ð37Þ
Once again each of the three dimensionless numbers,
wi=tmax i; z=tmax i and p, is constant during the process of
comparing outturns, and, since the personal traits,
s1i; s2i; . . . ; smi, remain constant over long periods, it fol-
lows from Eq. (38) that etmax i must be constant also.
In an analogy with the insurance case, Eq. (37) cannot
confirm Eq. (18), but the two equations agree on the same
three independent variables particular to the decision in
hand. Personal traits, s1i; s2i; . . . ; smi, are ignored in Eq. (18).
Similar arguments to those used in Section 4.1 allow Eq.
(37) to be extended to a test maximum premium, t testð Þmax i, and
associated risk-aversion, e testð Þtmax i.
5. The utility function produced when risk-aversion
stays constant at the point of decision
By the model of [1] discussed above, risk-aversion will
stay the same during the process of comparing outturns,
so that we may now proceed to the integration of Eq. (5)
under the condition that e = constant. It may first be noted
thatd
dw
lnu0ðwÞ ¼ u
00ðwÞ
u0ðwÞ ¼ 
e
w
ð38Þ
Hence:
lnu0ðwÞ ¼ 
Z
e
w
dw ð39Þ
so that u0ðwÞ ¼ exp 
Z
e
w
dw
 
and
uðwÞ ¼
Z
e

Z
e
w
dw
dw ð40Þ
Given that e = constant, then

Z
e
w
dw ¼ e
Z
1
w
dw ¼ e lnwþ a ¼ lnwe þ a ð41Þ
where a = constant. It follows further that
uðwÞ ¼
Z
elnw
eþadw ¼
Z
elnw
e
eadw
¼ ea
Z
wedw ¼ e
a w1e
1e þ b for e – 1
ea lnwþ c for e ¼ 1
(
ð42Þ
where b and c are constants and ea is a positive constant.
Hence, using the result of von Neumann and
Morgenstern that utility functions may be regarded as
valid to a positive linear transformation, we may remove
the constant terms, b and c, and ea, to produce:
uðwÞ ¼
w1e
1 e for e – 1
lnw for e ¼ 1
8<
: ð43Þ
Further progress may be made by noting that
ln x ¼ ln x ln 1 ð44Þ
implying that the lower term in Eq. (43) may be regarded
as the difference between the utility of wealth, w, and
the utility of one unit of money. Transferring the same
datum to the other term in Eq. (43) gives Eq. (6), repeated
below:
uðwÞ ¼
w1e  1
1 e for e – 1
lnw for e ¼ 1
8<
: ð6Þ
Eq. (6) may be regarded as defining a utility function in
its own right, since the subtraction of the constant,
1= 1 eð Þ, from the top line of the utility function of Eq.
(43) will produce another utility function under the von
Neumann and Morgenstern rules. Eq. (6) may also be
regarded as the difference between the utility of wealth
and the utility of one unit of wealth, when both are calcu-
lated from Eq. (43). Following the precedent of Cowell and
Gardiner [26], who attributed the utility function of Eq. (6)
to Atkinson [27], it is given the name the Atkinson utility
function in this paper, although its basic formulation was
obviously apparent earlier to Pratt [16].
The simplest Power utility may be found by multiplying
the right-hand side of the top line of Eq. (43) by 1 e for
the case e < 1 to give:
uðwÞ ¼ w1e for e < 1 ð45Þ
Like the more complicated Atkinson utility function, the
Power utility may be regarded either as a utility function
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case between the utility function of Eq. (45) applied to
wealth and the same utility function applied to zero
wealth. The Power utility function is slightly easier to
apply, but the Atkinson utility function has the advantage
that it caters for situations where the risk-aversion is
greater than unity, offering a smooth transition as e
increases from below 1.0, through unity and then above
1.0, as illustrated in [1].
6. Measuring risk-aversion from the maximum
acceptable insurance premium using a utility function
from the Power family
A variable important for decision taking, namely the
reluctance to invest, has been defined [29,20] as the differ-
ence in utility before and after investment, normalised to
the starting utility relative to the utility of either no money
(for the basic Power utility) or one unit of money for the
Atkinson utility function. When the Power utility function
is used, the symbol, R120P , is employed for the reluctance to
invest:
R120P ¼ ð1 pÞuðwÞ þ pu w zð Þ  u w tð ÞuðwÞ
¼ ð1 pÞw
1e þ p w zð Þ1e  w tð Þ1e
w1e
¼ 1 pþ p 1 z=wð Þ1e  1 t=wð Þ1e
¼ 1 pþ p 1 cð Þ1e  1 bð Þ1e
for e – 1 ð46Þ
where b is the normalised premium: b ¼ t=w, while c is the
normalised potential loss: c ¼ z=w. (The subscript, i, has
been dropped in this development simply in order to
reduce the ‘busy’ nature of the equations. The results are
still particular to the individual or organisation.)
Meanwhile the reluctance to invest for the Atkinson utility
function when e – 1 is:
R120A¼ð1pÞuðwÞþpu wzð Þu w tð ÞuðwÞ
¼
ð1pÞ w1e1 þp wzð Þ1e1  w tð Þ1e1 
w1e1
¼ w
1e
w1e1 1pþp 1cð Þ
1e 1bð Þ1e
 
e–1
ð47Þ
so that
R120A ¼ w
1e
w1e  1R120P e – 1 ð48Þ
In the case that e ¼ 1, the top line of Eq. (47) may be
developed as
R120A ¼ ð1 pÞ lnwþ p ln w zð Þ  ln w tð Þlnw
¼ p ln 1 z=wð Þ  ln 1 t=wð Þ
lnw
¼ p ln 1 cð Þ  ln 1 bð Þ
lnw
e ¼ 1
ð49ÞFor any given premium that a subject is prepared to
pay, it is required to find the value of risk-aversion, e, that
minimises the reluctance to invest, which is equivalent to
maximising the desire to invest. This value of risk-
aversion is known as the individual’s ‘permission point’,
eppi, since it is the value at which the decision maker will
feel most content with his decision to pay the specified
premium [29]. Differentiating Eq. (48) gives the rate of
change of R120A with e as:
dR120A
de
¼ w
1e
w1e  1R
0
120P þ R120P
w1e
w1e  1ð Þ2
lnw ð50Þ
and the valley minimum of R120A with respect to e is thus
given by:
w1e  1 R0120P  R120P lnw ¼ 0 ð51Þ
where R0120P ¼ dR120P=de is given by:
R0120P ¼ p 1 cð Þ1e ln 1 cð Þ  1 bð Þ1e ln 1 bð Þ ð52Þ
To illustrate the concepts, let us examine the case
where insurance cover is being considered against a possi-
ble small loss. The individual is assumed to have wealth of
£1000 and wishes to insure a washing machine he has just
bought for £250 against possible complete breakdown and
replacement, an event that occurs with a probability of 0.1,
so that the expected loss is £25. Fig. 1 gives shows the
behaviour of the reluctance to invest against risk-
aversion for a person prepared to pay a premium of £25,
the same as the expected loss. Clearly the individual would
be happy (just) to pay this premium if his risk-aversion
were etmax i ¼ 0, the value of risk-aversion at which the
locus of the line cuts the horizontal axis, but his utility
would be maximised at the minimum of the risk-
aversion locus, when ei ¼ 0:55, the ‘permission point’, eppi
[20].
The permission point in this instance coincides with a
reluctance to invest of – 8.53  104, the negative value
indicating a desire to invest in the insurance premium.
However, the person being forced to his limit on what he
would be prepared to pay for insurance will be prepared
to increase his permission point until it reaches the ‘point
of indiscriminate decision’, eindisi. Now the absolute value
of his reluctance to invest will have fallen to the limiting
level at which he is still able to discriminate between out-
turn utilities: R120Aij jei¼eppi ¼ R
ðlimÞ
120Ai. Any increase in risk-
aversion will now lead to a random decision on whether
to invest or not, so no decision should be taken when
ei > eindisi.
Thus the same data on insurance premia allow the indi-
vidual’s limiting reluctance to invest, RðlimÞ120Ai, to be estimated
in addition to the permission point, eppi. Fig. 2 shows the
locus of reluctance to invest versus risk-aversion at
insurance premia of £26, £28 and £30. As his MAP
increases, the individual’s risk-aversion needed to sanction
that MAP also increases, but this is accompanied by a
decrease in the absolute value of the reluctance to invest
at which he can still discriminate. Thus if the individual’s
MAP is found to be £26, then his permission point will be
eppi ¼ 0:74 and his limiting reluctance to invest will be
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Fig. 1. Insurance case of Section 6: the behaviour of reluctance to invest,
R120Ai , showing the minimum value of risk-aversion (ei = 0.0) at which a
person offered an insurance premium at £25 could sanction the decision
and the actual value at which the decision to invest would be made
(ei = 0.55).
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RðlimÞ120Ai ¼ 7:74 105, while if his MAP is £30, then
eppi ¼ 1:63 and RðlimÞ120Ai ¼ 6:47 106.
The figures for the permission point (the actual risk-
aversion for taking the decision to buy insurance) may be
compared with those produced by the Taylor series model,
based on an assumption of utility break-even, equivalent
to a reluctance to invest of zero: R120Ai ¼ 0. Thus for a
MAP of tmax i = £26, eBEi ¼ 0:36, for tmax i = £28, eBEi ¼ 1:1,
while for tmax i = £30, eBEi ¼ 1:87, a different set of risk-
aversions from those cited in the previous paragraph.
Fig. 3 displays, for a wide range of possible MAPs:
 the permission point, eppi (the true value of risk-
aversion at which a decision to buy insurance will be
taken),
 the utility break-even value of risk-aversion, eBEi, pre-
dicted by the Atkinson utility function,
 the utility break-even value of risk-aversion, eBEi, pre-
dicted by a Taylor series expansion.-5.E-04
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Fig. 2. Insurance case of Section 6: reluctance to invest versus risk-
aversion for insurance premia of £26, £28 and £30.The Taylor series figure for eBEi may be seen to come
close to the value of eBEi predicted by the Atkinson utility
function for MAPs between £21 and £26, but it diverges
from the accurate, utility-function-generated figure out-
side this range. Of course, both of these figures are approx-
imations only to the actual figure needed, which is the
permission point, eppi. There is evidence for the utility func-
tion figure for eBEi converging towards eppi at high values of
MAP, but the Taylor series value of eBEi diverges.
Fig. 4 shows the limiting reluctance to invest over a
range of possible MAPs for insurance premium. Premia of
£31 and above lead to RðlimÞ120Ai < 5 106 , a level likely to
be beyond everyone’s ability to discriminate between out-
comes. This restricts the upper bound for possible MAPs to
a rather low level. This limit, only £6 (20%) up on the
expected loss is thus very tight for this example where
rather small sums of money are at stake, indicating that
results derived for this case may be sensitive to quantisa-
tion noise on the MAP recorded.
To complete the picture, Fig. 5 shows the behaviour of
an individual’s reluctance to invest, R120Ai, versus his risk-
aversion, ei, for very low insurance premia. These premia
are well below the expected loss (£25), and it is therefore
unlikely that they would be offered by any insurance com-
pany except possibly as a loss-leader. The permission
point, eppi, has moved into the left-hand plane and become
negative. As the insurance premium becomes cheaper, so
the permission point, eppi, becomes ever more negative.
The theoretical possibility of highly negative risk-
aversions raises the question as to whether everyone is
equipped to feel that degree of risk confidence. The possi-
bility that there may be a variation in the highest risk con-
fidence (=most negative risk-aversion) that different
people are able to feel may be modelled by assigning each
person a lower level of risk-aversion, eðlowÞi , below which his
risk-aversion cannot be reduced. The interest of highly
negative risk-aversions subject to a limit, eðlowÞi , is mainly
theoretical in the insurance case, with eðlowÞi being included
for completeness only. However, it has more direct impli-
cations for the case of a lottery.-2.5
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Fig. 3. Insurance case of Section 6: permission point, epp , minimum risk-
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Fig. 4. Insurance case of Section 6: absolute value of the limiting
reluctance to invest for a range of possible MAPs for insurance.
296 P.J. Thomas /Measurement 79 (2016) 285–301Summarising: the location of the minimum reluctance
to invest, eppi;RðlimÞ120Ai
 
, in the plane of reluctance to invest
versus risk-aversion allows inferential measurements to
be made of both the risk-aversion, etmax i ¼ eppi, associated
with the person’s maximum acceptable premium, tmax i,
and his limiting reluctance to invest, RðlimÞ120Ai. From an alter-
native viewpoint, it is possible to find etmax i if the variables
particular to the current decision are known: z; wi; p and
tmax i, together with the individual’s limiting reluctance to
invest, RðlimÞ120Ai. Including his lower level of risk-aversion,
eðlowÞi , for completeness, Eq. (36) may be expanded to give
the general result that the person’s risk-aversion at his
maximum acceptable premium is a function of up to 5
dimensionless variables:etmax i ¼ g ztmax i ;
wi
tmax i
;p;RðlimÞ120Ai; e
ðlowÞ
i
 
ð53Þ
Thus the number of relevant personal traits,m, emerges
as two in the insurance case: s1i ¼ RðlimÞ120Ai and eðlowÞi , both of
which are dimensionless, as foreshadowed in Section 4.-1.E-01
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Fig. 5. Insurance case of Section 6: reluctance to invest versus risk-
aversion at very low insurance premia.7. Measuring risk-aversion from insurance premia
where the possible loss is a sizeable fraction of the
individual’s wealth
An enhanced perspective on risk-aversion is given in
the second case considered, that of a typical UK adult,
assumed to possess £180,000 of wealth, mostly contained
in his house, for which he is interested in taking out build-
ings insurance. The potential loss is £150,000, with proba-
bility 0.001, implying an expected loss of £150. Fig. 6
compares the results for the buildings insurance case. It
is clear from the Figure that the Taylor series expansion
method does not give an accurate indication even of the
minimum risk-aversion except for a very restricted region.
This is not unexpected, in view of the fact that the potential
loss is a large fraction of the subject’s wealth, thus contra-
vening an assumption of the Taylor series expansion.
The capability of the utility function method to find the
risk-aversion in more general, realistic situations brings
with it two immediate advantages. First, the absolute value
of the reluctance to invest does not fall to 5  106 or
below, the level likely to be beyond everyone’s ability to
discriminate between outcomes, until the insurance pre-
mium has risen to about £350, which is more than twice
the expected loss See Fig. 7. This allows the measurement,
potentially with good accuracy, of a fairly large range of
insurance premia with which different people might feel
happy. Moreover, the change in risk-aversion with small
changes in acceptable premium is much less in the house
insurance case than in the case of washing machine insur-
ance, making the results less sensitive to quantisation
noise.
8. Measuring risk-aversion from the maximum
acceptable price for a lottery ticket using a Power-
family utility function
In the case of the lottery, the reluctance to invest under
a Power utility function, R120P , is:-2
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Fig. 6. Insurance case of Section 7: comparison between the utility
function and Taylor series expansion methods.
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¼ w
1e  ð1 pÞ w tð Þ1e  p w t þ zð Þ1e
w1e
¼ 1 ð1 pÞ 1 t=wð Þ1e  p 1 t=wþ z=wð Þ1e
¼ 1 ð1 pÞ 1 bð Þ1e  p 1 bþ cð Þ1e
for e – 1 ð54Þ
where b is the normalised price of the lottery ticket:
b ¼ t=w, while c is the normalised potential win: c ¼ z=w.
(Again the subscript, i, has been omitted in this develop-
ment simply in order to reduce the ‘busy’ nature of the
equations. The results are still particular to the individual
or organisation.) Meanwhile the reluctance to invest found
from using the Atkinson utility function when e – 1 is:
R120A¼uðwÞð1pÞu w tð Þpu w tþzð ÞuðwÞ
¼
w1e1ð1pÞ w tð Þ1e1
 
p w tþzð Þ1e1
 
w1e1
¼ w
1e
w1e1 1ð1pÞ 1bð Þ
1ep 1bþcð Þ1e
 
e–1
ð55Þ
so that, as with the insurance case, we may write
R120A ¼ w
1e
w1e  1R120P ð56Þ
Expanding the top line of Eq. (55) for the case of e ¼ 1
gives
R120A ¼ lnwð1pÞ ln w tð Þp ln w tþzð Þlnw
¼ lnwð1pÞ lnwþ ln 1 t=wð Þð Þp lnwþ ln 1 t=wþz=wð Þð Þ
lnw
¼ð1pÞ ln 1bð Þp ln 1bþ cð Þ
lnw
e¼1
ð57Þ
or
R120A ¼ p ln 1 bð Þ  ln 1 bþ cð Þð Þ  ln 1 bð Þlnw e ¼ 1
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Fig. 7. Insurance case of Section 7: limiting reluctance to invest over a
range of MAPs.Eq. (51) may be used again to find the extremum of the
curve of R120A against e, but in this, lottery case, the extre-
mum found will be a peak. In this case, R120P is given by
Eq. (54) and differentiating that equation with respect to
risk-aversion gives:R0120P ¼ ð1 pÞ 1 bð Þ1e ln 1 bð Þ
þ p 1 bþ cð Þ1e ln 1 bþ cð Þ ð59Þ
Consider the example of a person with wealth, w, of
£1000 wondering whether or not to buy a ticket in a lottery
with a prize, z, of £10,000, so that c ¼ z=w ¼ 10. Let us sup-
pose that the probability of winning the prize, p, is 1 in
1000 and so the expected value of the lottery is £10.
Suppose that the price of a lottery is gradually raised from
£1 in a procedure analogous to an auction, and that one
person, let us call him person 1, stops bidding at £4.63, sig-
nifying that this is his maximum acceptable price. Fig. 8
shows his reluctance to invest against his risk-aversion
for this MAP. Assuming the person is being pushed to his
most adventurous in deciding on his MAP, tmax i, his corre-
sponding risk-aversion, etmax i, will have been driven down
to his limiting value of risk-aversion, eðlowÞi . Since he is still
prepared to buy a ticket at this price, his reluctance to
invest cannot be positive, and, since he has reached the
limit of what he will pay, his reluctance to invest will be
zero. The corresponding value of risk-aversion is
etmax i ¼ 0:5 ¼ eðlowÞi .
This may be seen more clearly by considering Fig. 9,
which shows the reluctance to invest versus risk-aversion
for ticket prices of £4.49, £4.63 and £4.77. Anyone who is
prepared to pay £4.49 for a ticket must have a lower
threshold on risk-aversion of 0.52 or below; anyone pre-
pared to pay £4.63 for the same ticket must have a lower
threshold of 0.50 or below, while the lower threshold of
someone still in the auction at £4.77 must have a lower
threshold of 0.48 or below. Person 1 exited the auction
after the price reached £4.49 but before it rose to £4.77,
and so his lower threshold on risk-aversion must be below
0.52 but cannot be 0.48 or lower. Hence eðlowÞ1 must lie
between 0.48 and 0.52: 0:48 < eðlowÞ1 < 0:52. Assuming the
auction price is raised continuously, the range can be tight-
ened, allowing us to deduce that someone leaving the-6.0E-03
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Fig. 8. Lottery case of Section 8: reluctance to invest versus risk-aversion
for a range of tmax i .
298 P.J. Thomas /Measurement 79 (2016) 285–301auction immediately after offering £4.63 must have a
lower threshold on risk aversion of eðlowÞi ¼ 0:5.
While etmax i ¼ 0:5 will almost certainly be the domi-
nant mode, it needs to be borne in mind that another mode
of behaviour is conceivable, should the individual have a
very high value of limiting risk-aversion, eðlowÞi . For exam-
ple, if the lower threshold on risk-aversion of person 1
were 1.61 or more, viz. eðlowÞ1 P 1:61, while, at the same
time, his limiting value of reluctance to invest was
RðlimÞ120A1 ¼ 3 105, he might find himself caught in a region
where he could not discriminate between the advantages
of buying a ticket at £4.63 or not. Were he able to become
rather more risk-confident and test his reaction to a risk-
aversion of 1.0, for example, he would decide against buy-
ing the ticket, but this strategy is ruled out for him by his
high value of eðlowÞi . Hence his decision would become inde-
terminate, and it is possible that he might buy at ticket at
£4.63 even though he was experiencing a very high risk-
aversion. This sort of dualism associated with risk deci-
sions was observed by Atkinson [30] in the behaviour of
children at play. The phenomenon has been explained pre-
viously, [17], in terms of risk-aversion.
Fig. 8 shows also cases where the MAP is £10 and £15.2,
from which the most likely risk-aversions, etmax i, are 0.0
and 0.25, although it would still be possible theoretically
for someone experiencing very high levels of risk-aversion
to purchase these tickets, if his value of eðlowÞi were suffi-
ciently high.
The application of an Atkinson utility function is able to
give a further important insight into the behaviour of
inveterate gamblers. For it is possible for someone who
has a very low limit for risk-aversion, eðlowÞi << 0, to regard
even very expensive lottery tickets as worth buying, even
at many times their expected return. Fig. 10 shows that
people with very low limiting risk-aversions, eðlowÞi = -1.0,
-1.2 and -1.4, could be content to buy tickets for £60, £90
and £150 respectively. Despite the fact that the expected
loss is significant in all these cases, someone with a very
low limit on his risk-aversion could see a positive gain in
expected utility.
The mechanism displayed in Fig. 10 provides a rational,
economic explanation for why some gamblers take huge-1.0E-03
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Fig. 9. Lottery case of Section 8: reluctance to invest versus risk-aversion
for tmax i = £4.49, £4.63 and £4.77.risks, even though they know that they are almost certain
to lose. Because the low limit on his risk-aversion is set too
low, a problem gambler can experience a highly negative
risk-aversion, enabling him to feel a highly negative reluc-
tance to invest in a very risky venture, equivalent to a high
desire to invest.
9. Discussion
The economic parameter, risk-aversion, has profound
importance in economics, but attempts to measure it have
been sporadic only. Indeed, some respected actuarial scien-
tists believe it is impossible to determine the form of a util-
ity function and hence the decision-maker’s risk-aversion
in practice [31]:
‘‘It is impossible to determine which utility functions
are used ‘in practice’. Utility theory merely states the
existence of a utility function. We could try to recon-
struct a decision maker’s utility function from the deci-
sions he takes, by confronting him with a large number
of questions like: ‘Which premium P are you willing to
pay to avoid a loss . . . that could occur with probability
q?’ . . . In practice, we would soon experience the limita-
tions of utility theory: the decision maker will grow
increasingly irritated as the interrogation continues
and his decisions will become inconsistent”.
Many economists, too, regard utility as a useful theoret-
ical construct only, and not one that is open to measure-
ment, a position described as the ‘standard model’ of
economics in Chapter 1 of [32]:
‘‘Utility maximisation by individuals sits nicely with
utilitarianism in general, or with other kindred
approaches, such as the maximisation of an equity-
preferring social welfare function that respects individ-
ual choices. In this framework, there is no need to mea-
sure utility, because we have everything that we need.
People’s choices reveal everything about their prefer-
ences that we need to know. Of course, there would
be no harm in measuring utility, if we could do so.
But it is unnecessary and, indeed, doing away with util-
ity, marginal utility, and interpersonal comparisons of
utility was long thought to be one of the great achieve-
ments of modern economics.”.-2.0E-01
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Fig. 10. Lottery case of Section 8: reluctance to invest versus risk-
aversion for very expensive lottery tickets.
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more economists than that advanced by von Neumann
and Morgenstern [8].
And it must be conceded that attempting to measure
risk-aversion using traditional approaches based on
Taylor series expansions are likely to be problematic
because of the requirement for small excursions from the
starting wealth. This restriction applies not only to the lot-
tery ticket price and the insurance premium, where it may
not cause too many problems, but also to the lottery prize
and the potential loss, where its imposition will certainly
be awkward to accommodate.
The constraint introduced by the Taylor series that the
prize from the lottery must not be comparable with the
starting wealth of any of the individuals means that the
test gamble must be rendered of artificially low impor-
tance to all the individuals in the sample. The result of this
is that it will be rational for all of them to employ a low
risk-aversion in their assessment of it. Any study trying
to pick out differences between groups will thus be ren-
dered problematic, as reported in [28], where it was found
hard to differentiate between the risk-aversions of entre-
preneurs and others on the basis of a lottery with prize
set at only 1000 guilders (about €450).
Moreover, a logical gap has been found in the conven-
tional, Taylor series method of analysing the risk-
aversion experienced in buying a lottery ticket at the indi-
vidual’s maximum acceptable price. Taking the risk-
aversion at utility break-even as the value used by the per-
son in deciding his maximum ticket price requires an unac-
knowledged further mechanism. It is necessary to posit
that the individual has a pre-set lower threshold, eðlowÞi
below which individual i may not reduce his risk-aversion.
The restriction to small deviations inherent in Taylor
series analysis presents a problem in using the technique
to infer risk-aversion from the maximum acceptable insur-
ance premium. The technique is valid only for potential
losses that are relatively unthreatening to the individuals’
wealth, where it is rational for all the individuals con-
cerned to employ a low risk-aversion. So while insurance
of domestic devices of relatively low value is open to anal-
ysis using a Taylor series, bigger potential losses such as
house insurance are not. Since it is only when the loss is
a significant fraction of his wealth that a rational person
is predicted to exhibit a high risk-aversion [20,21], a good
signal-to-noise ratio is to be expected only in the latter
case. Behaviour in a more demanding insurance situation
would need to be examined in any study seeking to estab-
lish whether different risk-aversions were exhibited by dif-
ferent types of individuals.
A further weakness in the conventional application of
the Taylor series expansion to determine risk-aversion
from insurance data consists in the fact that it is generally
incorrect to assume that the risk-aversion at utility break-
even will be the value experienced by the individual when
paying his maximum acceptable premium for insurance.
The correct value is the permission point, eppi, when it coin-
cides with the point of indiscriminate decision:
eppi ¼ eindisi. This coincidence of values will occur when
the reluctance to invest, R120Ai, has reached such a lowlevel, RðlimÞ120Ai that the individual can no longer discriminate
between the expected utilities of the two courses of action
under consideration.
The lower threshold on risk-aversion, eðlowÞi and the lim-
iting reluctance to invest, Rlim120Ai, are two further dimension-
less parameters that are particular to the individual and
should be considered for measurement in addition to
risk-aversion.
The lottery and insurance cases are particularly useful
to consider because they are canonical representations of
more complex situations where decisions under uncer-
tainty are required. However an insight into problem gam-
bling is provided by the finding that a lower threshold on
risk-aversion, eðlowÞi , particular to the individual, is one of
the traits necessary to explain the maximum acceptable
price for a lottery ticket. The model suggests that the lower
threshold on risk-aversion, eðlowÞi , is what differentiates
problem gamblers from the majority of the population.
The parameter is set too low in gamblers making consis-
tent losses.10. Measuring risk-aversion: the challenge
Information of great economic value is potentially avail-
able from exercises to measure people’s risk-aversions
when faced with different decisions. A theoretical frame-
work has now been developed to allow an accurate mea-
surement of an individual’s risk-aversion from his
responses both to a lottery and to insurance.
There are still difficulties to overcome. The first lies in
devising a process to elicit from the individual his maxi-
mum acceptable price for a lottery ticket or his maximum
acceptable insurance premium, and ensuring that his sup-
posedly highest value is truly representative of what he
would offer in a real situation. Then there is the fundamen-
tal problem that the individual will exhibit multiple values
of risk-aversion depending on the importance of the deci-
sion to him.
Nevertheless the use of a single class of utility function
with risk-aversion as sole parameter, as recommended in
this paper, brings with it both clarification and simplifica-
tion, enabling a more reliable measurement of risk-
aversion to be made.
This comes at a time when there is considerable interest
in economic indicators that reflect the subjective feelings
of the person taking the decision [32]. Clearly risk-
aversion is one such indicator rooted in people’s feelings.
Moreover, it has the advantage that its definition in math-
ematical terms allows a rigorous, inferential measurement
to be made. This is also the case for the related measure-
ments of the lower threshold on risk aversion, eðlowÞi , and
the limiting reluctance to invest, RðlimÞ120Ai.
Measurement specialists with an interest in ‘soft’ mea-
surement or behavioural economists might care to take up
the challenge. Alternatively, the data held within the insur-
ance industry might make an insurance company the best
candidate to carry out an exercise that might bring them
and their clients useful commercial benefits.
300 P.J. Thomas /Measurement 79 (2016) 285–30111. Conclusions
The paper has reviewed the historical development of
the concepts of utility and risk-aversion, starting nearly
300 years ago. It is a tribute to the distinguished pioneers
that much of their thinking retains a relevance today.
Risk-aversion was identified as an important dimension-
less parameter in 1964, but has tended to be regarded
since that time as a mathematical construct. However the
argument has been made in this paper that risk-aversion
is the fundamental descriptor of the feeling guiding the
person taking a decision between two alternatives when
the outcome of one or both is uncertain. The fact that
risk-aversion is dimensionless (unlike the ‘coefficient of
absolute risk aversion’, a name that seems to claim too
much) gives it the capability to model situations where
what is at risk can be a variety of different things of impor-
tance to the individual, not just money, but status, happi-
ness and so on.
Conventionally, inferential measurements of risk-
aversion have been made by expanding about the utility
of starting wealth using a Taylor series. However, this
approach can be valid only when the stakes are low. In
such circumstances one would expect risk-aversion to be
close to zero for everyone, making its measurement diffi-
cult and subject to quantisation noise. It becomes difficult
then to distinguish any possible difference in risk-aversion
between two people of different character, e.g. an entre-
preneur and a salaried professional.
The conventional, Taylor series approach appears to
have been motivated in part, at least, by a desire to render
the results independent of the precise form of the utility
function. However, taking the case of decisions about
money, if risk-aversion is regarded as a function of the pre-
sent state of wealth, rather than as being altered by an act
of imagination in response to possible future changes to
that wealth, the valid classes of utility function reduce to
one. This is the Power family, for which risk-aversion is
the sole parameter. The grounding of utility in a single
class of function allows more direct analysis of decisions.
This more direct analysis has shown up two further
shortcomings associated with the use of the conventional,
Taylor series expansion. In the case of the lottery, it has
been shown that assigning a unique value to the risk-
aversion based on the maximum price that someone is pre-
pared to offer for a lottery ticket requires a further mecha-
nism not normally mentioned, namely a lower threshold
for risk-aversion unique to the person. In the case of insur-
ance, the conventional thinking is that the decision to
invest in insurance is taken at utility break-even, when
the reluctance to invest is zero: R120Ai ¼ 0, whereas this
paper has suggested that the decision is actually taken at
the minimum of reluctance to invest, when dR120Ai=de ¼ 0.
Dimensional analysis has been used to show that the
risk-aversion when deciding on the maximum acceptable
price for a lottery ticket or on the maximum acceptable
insurance premium can be represented as a function of
three dimensionless variables particular to the decision
at hand and a set of dimensionless character traits. Thethree dimensionless variables are: (i) the prize or loss
denominated in terms of the maximum acceptable price
for the lottery ticket or the insurance premium, (ii) the
individual’s or organisation’s wealth, denominated in the
same units and (iii) the probability of winning the prize
or making the loss. Risk-aversions derived using Taylor
series methods are found to be functions of these 3 dimen-
sionless variables, with no further allowance being made
for character traits. Risk-aversions derived using the
Atkinson utility function depend on the same 3 dimension-
less variables but also on two new, nondimensional char-
acter traits: the limiting reluctance to invest, RðlimÞ120Ai, and
the lower threshold on risk-aversion, eðlowÞi . Inferential mea-
surements of these parameters should be possible and
fruitful. The latter parameter, in particular, may offer
insights into problem gambling.
The paper has established a theoretical framework for
the measurement of risk-aversion and the two related
parameters, limiting reluctance to invest and lower
threshold on risk-aversion. Successful measurement offers
the chance for evidence-based utility calculations to be
made, with the potential for new economic insights as a
result.
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Appendix A. The range of lottery ticket price, t, over
which e maxjt;wið Þ is a decreasing function of t
Consider Eq. (17) repeated below:
e maxjt;wið Þ ¼ 2wi pz tð Þ
pz2  2pzt þ t2 ð17Þ
The properties of the equation mean that risk-aversion, e,
will be a decreasing function of t for 0 < t < t0 1þ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃoApð Þ,
where t0 ¼ pz is the expected value of the lottery ticket,
equivalent to the utility of the ticket for someone with a
neutral risk-aversion, namely e ¼ 0, while oA is the odds
against winning: oA ¼ ð1 pÞ=p.
The upper point of the range will occur when the differ-
ential, de=dt, ceases being negative, where:
P.J. Thomas /Measurement 79 (2016) 285–301 301de
dt
¼ 2wi pz
2  2pzt þ t2  2w pz tð Þ 2pzþ 2tð Þ
pz2  2pzt þ t2 2
¼ 2wi t
2  2pzt þ 2p2z2  pz2 
pz2  2pzt þ t2 2
ðA:2Þ
Risk-aversion, e, will decrease to a minimum at the
point where de=dt ¼ 0, corresponding to the positive root
of t2  2pzt þ 2p2z2  pz2 ¼ 0, given by
t ¼ 2pzþ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4p2z2  8p2z2 þ 4pz2
p
2
¼ pzþ zp12ð1 pÞ12
¼ t0 1þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
oA
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